THE COURT: Is somebody going to give me the patent statute? Thank you.

I don't know what on earth I did with it.

MR. ROBERTSON: I think I just want to add two constructs to give Your Honor to try to frame the issue here. The first construct is this. Dr. Shamos relies on just three things for his opinion. The '989 patent as it existed and was issued, the TV/2 brochure, and the TV/2 general information manual. He testified under cross-examination those were the only three things he relied on to form either his anticipation or obviousness opinions.

He didn't rely on the '989, under the RIMS system, whatever configuration you want to call it at whatever time, he didn't rely on the TV/2 system, whatever configuration at whatever time, and he didn't rely on the RIMS brochure at all. He didn't have opinions with respect to those three things.

So to sit here now and sort of argue what bucket they fall in under 102(a) or 102(b) I think is a frolicking detour because there isn't expert testimony which would permit the jury to conclude that the RIMS system, for example, whatever version or iteration was, it could invalidate any claim for example.

The other construct I want to raise is the testimony was that the RIMS system had many versions and many variations starting as early as 1989. Would I concede there was some RIMS system out there? Yes. But without any specificity as to what features it actually had, it can't provide the basis under 102(a) or 102(b) to invalidate the claims because we don't have that level of specificity.

Certainly the RIMS brochure, I would submit, doesn't have that level of specificity, particularly when you consider that the Lawson's expert couldn't even articulate a reasonable basis as to why it would invalidate any claim and did not do so.

MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, I can address that. The patents-in-suit actually provide the direct linkage between the description Dr. Shamos relied on in the patent, the '989 RIMS patent on the one hand, and the fact that that RIMS system as described in that patent corresponds to the RIMS system that was known under 102(a) and in public use and on sale under 102(b).

The section of the patents are in, for example, in the '683 patent, and this language is in all three of them, but in the paragraph beginning at line 10 and continuing to line 35 of column 1 of the

'683 patent, it specifically links the Fisher RIMS system "described in U.S. Patent No. 5,712,989."

It is that exact system as described. It describes it as "known requisition purchasing systems." It's one of the systems that are admitted in the background section of the patent as known as of -- from the April 2, '93 filing date.

THE COURT: Well, it's known.

MR. McDONALD: Yes.

THE COURT: But was it known who, to where, when?

MR. McDONALD: We have other evidence that establishes that, but what this says is that specific system that Dr. Shamos relied on was known. We've got the corroborating and other information from the inventors and relating to the brochure and their time line that show that that was known and how the RIMS system was known out there in the '92, '93 time frame. Ms. O'Loughlin's testimony, as well, about that. But the patent establishes --

THE COURT: Ms. O'Loughlin's doesn't testify to that. Ms. O'Loughlin's testimony was neigh unto useless. It basically established that she signed some things. And then she typically thought she was signing truthful things. And then they used an

application and that some version of the RIMS system was in effect when she signed that document, which is the trademark application. And the attached document is a brochure. That brochure Dr. Shamos didn't lay any connection to at all. So that is not probative of when this was in the public domain.

If it was a preponderance of the evidence standard, it might very well be something the jury could do, but how could you find that by a clear and convincing evidence when the undisputed evidence from the inventors is that there never was a system such as described in the patent, the '989 patent, which what's his name relied on, Shamos relied on, that everyone would market anywhere.

MR. McDONALD: The testimony --

THE COURT: There were versions that did, but not that one.

MR. McDONALD: But when you put their testimony, and obviously they were bias witnesses fighting this issue, but that time line doesn't lie. Mr. Kinross said he put that time line together with Mr. Momyer looking over his shoulder that shows that all the features relevant to this case were in that RIMS system as of 1993. That brochure does certainly corroborate and bolster that information. That's a

document Mr. Momyer picked a couple of things where he said, Well, we didn't have all the interfaces developed yet, but he had very little that he said in there that actually was not representative of the system as described in that brochure.

We're entitled to that same inference that ePlus has been trying to draw in this case, which is when Fisher came out with some documents distributed into the public, distributed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and representing the use of that Fisher RIMS trademark in commerce, that that document is a truthful and accurate document. The testimony from the inventors was that it was put together --

THE COURT: What system is it? That's the point. What system is it that's the truthful document to which you are entitled to an inference on? I think you're entitled to an inference that a publicly filed document is truthful, but it doesn't refer to the patent.

MR. McDONALD: It's April of '93 is when it was filed.

THE COURT: Wait a minute, Mr. McDonald. You have to stop trying to put something else into the equation and answer what I'm asking you because I'm trying to get to a resolution of this.

There's no evidence as to what system was being described in that trademark application, is there? What date?

MR. McDONALD: Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just tell me who did it. Don't be larding up with yeah, there is. Tell me who did it and what did he or she say.

MR. McDONALD: We have the trademark brochure itself was represented as accurate information with respect to its ability to generate requisitions.

THE COURT: Just a minute. What is the date?

MR. McDONALD: Pardon?

THE COURT: It wasn't dated.

MR. McDONALD: It had a date stamp on it at the Trademark Office of April of '93.

THE COURT: That's the date it was in the Trademark Office. It wasn't dated.

MR. McDONALD: Well, that's right, but that certainly establishes that it was in existence in April of '93, which is more than one year before the filing date of the patent-in-suit and it represented to the Trademark Office as an example proof of use of the trademark in commerce by that date. So we do have that date very well established.

THE COURT: That's use of the trademark in

commerce, not the system.

MR. McDONALD: Well, the trademark application specifically says the trademark is used with a computer system. There was --

THE COURT: Of a computer system. Not the one in the patent.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, can I just read the cross-examination of Dr. Shamos? It's right on point here.

Question: And you're aware that the RIMS system starting perhaps the late '80s all the way up to the year 2000 went through many iterations, correct, many different versions?

Yes.

Which version are you relying on when you're rendering your opinions?

Answer: That described the '989 patent.

Question: So it's only confined to the '989 patent, right? You're not relying on and you didn't offer any testimony with respect to any versions that were in commercial use between the late '90s and 1994, for example, right?

Answer: I don't have personal knowledge, but there was testimony that the '989 patent fairly described the actual RIMS system as it was

distributed.

Question: There was also testimony from the inventors in their deposition that many of the functionalities of the '989 patent never implemented. Do you recall reviewing that?

Yes.

So what you're relying on when you're offering your opinions, though, is just the '989 patent; isn't that right?

MR. McDONALD: We're not disputing that that

MR. ROBERTSON: I'm sorry, no. Did you point to any other versions or produce any other documentation of a technical nature of the RIMS system as being used between 1989 and 2000?

No, I didn't personally because, as I said, I don't have personal knowledge of the RIMS system as distributed.

Would it be fair to say that the inventors have personal knowledge of the RIMS system because they worked on it, right?

I don't know what knowledge they have. I know what they said.

Well, you know that Mr. Momyer and Mr. Johnson are actually inventors of the '989 patent,

correct?

Yes.

And I then went on to ask him about whether they would be in a better position to understand what's in the patent. And, of course, he didn't agree with me on that. But he certainly didn't have any knowledge of any of the versions and disclaimed relying on any of the versions and only relied on the '989 patent.

THE COURT: So your point is that because he didn't, this evidence that they are arguing about is irrelevant?

MR. ROBERTSON: Twofold. One, there's nobody to testify that whatever system was in effect between 1989, let's say, and 1994 invalidates any claim because the expert didn't do it.

And No. 2, there's no evidence in the record with specific specificity to show what the features are of these unnamed versions or iterations that existed during that time period to be able to show by clear and convincing evidence that a jury could rely on under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and could come back with a conclusion as to a finding on that basis.

THE COURT: And that sends the '172, Claim One, invalidity case out the door.

MR. ROBERTSON: I would suggest that or else
I would suggest it doesn't permit the jury to consider
some unspecified '989 system or RIMS system as an
invalidating prior public use or on sale device.

THE COURT: So it results in JMOL on all claims of all patents instead of the way it was presented to me was that it was a '172, Claim One, issue. Now, I think you're broadening it to try to reach all of the claims, and it was never argued that way.

MR. ROBERTSON: No, sir.

THE COURT: So you're arguing it only with respect to '172, Claim One?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir. But I am arguing that an unspecified RIMS system without any expert testimony to offer to the jury that this unspecified system invalidated any claim can't go to the jury. Similarly, just while we're on the topic --

THE COURT: Well, that relates to all the claims.

MR. ROBERTSON: Just for on sale or prior public use. But the '989 patent still can be considered as prior art for the '683 patent and the '516 patent for anticipation and obviousness based on that and the 2 TV/2 brochures.

THE COURT: So your theory is that what takes 1 2 102(a) out of the case for '172, Claim One, also takes the 102(a) out of the case for the other claims as 3 well; is that right? 4 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, I'm being told. 5 MS. ALBERT: We're saying they have no right 6 to submit to the jury any theory under 102(a) or 7 102(b) whatsoever. Their only theory for anticipation 8 9 would be strictly under 102(e) as to the '989 patent. 10 THE COURT: And they can't do that because of the commonality of assignment provision. 11 12 MR. ROBERTSON: But that is only for Claim 13 One of the '172 patent. 14 MS. ALBERT: No. THE COURT: You're asking for JMOL 15 16 unarticulated on everything. Do you see what you've 17 done? And you didn't actually present it that way. 18 MS. ALBERT: That's true, yes. THE COURT: Well, isn't that the consequence? 19 20 MS. ALBERT: Yes. THE COURT: What you said in the argument, 21 and I have a big Post-it on here, relates to Claim 22 23 One, '172 patent, on this whole 103, 102(a), (b) and

MS. ALBERT: So the 102(a) and B issues go to

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(e) issue.

all claims.

So, Your Honor, we're saying that there is no theory that could be sent to the jury under Section 102(a) or 102(b) because there has been no evidence offered of any RIMS system that existed prior to 1994 that was in public use or on sale. We just don't know which specific version at what particular time having what particular features they would rely on.

THE COURT: And in order to anticipate, the single reference has to hit every element of every claim.

MS. ALBERT: Right. So we're saying they couldn't have no theory under 102(a) or 102(b) to go to the jury. Then as to this 103(c), that only applies to Claim One of the '172.

Well, the 102(e), our JMOL this morning would apply to all of the asserted claims because the '989 patent has been offered as an anticipatory prior art reference against all of the claims. And if it's a 102(e) reference, then we're saying it's not an invention by none.

MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, there is further evidence that contradicts what ePlus --

THE COURT: Just one minute, if you would, please.

But if the only reference is 102(e), then by another means, according to Ms. Stoll-DeBell in 102(e), that it has to be virtual identity of others, right? In other words, is that where your another argument comes in?

MR. McDONALD: That's right. If we're only going in on 102 anticipation, as opposed to obviousness, that's when this issue comes up. And there is certainly evidence to show because that Claim One of the '172, that's the one that doesn't even have the catalogs in it. So there is substantial evidence to show that RIMS system did have a sort of database and other features that would anticipate that specific claim all by itself. There is anticipation.

Moreover, on this issue of the RIMS system changing, because I think we're showing that the system was in the marketplace on sale in '92 or early '93. The question was raised, Well, yes, but what version was it?

We did get evidence out of the one of the inventors, he had to admit that the RIMS system, he testified under oath, was pretty much "wrapped up" by 1991.

This was also corroborated by the time line that shows all the key features that would be related

to satisfying the elements of Claim One of the '172 patent were in the RIMS system prior to 1993.

I understand ePlus can argue all about changes they say were made, but these reluctant inventors still had to admit through that time line and that testimony about the system being wrapped up that there was some firmness to what was in existence by April of '93. It was a RIMS system that had the key features that were relevant to the claims.

THE COURT: Where is the Kinross comment?

I've got it. It's Exhibit DX 402.

MS. ALBERT: Your Honor, there hasn't --

THE COURT: What do you say about this?

MS. ALBERT: There hasn't been any expert testimony to apply that time line on a claim by claim, element by element basis under the rigorous analysis that's required to prove anticipation. Nobody performed that analysis.

MR. McDONALD: That's not --

MR. ROBERTSON: The bottom line, Your Honor, if Dr. Shamos didn't take this system, whatever it is, and maybe he did agree that it has some level of detail, and tell the jury why it invalidates, isn't that the end of the inquiry? Because he didn't do that on the RIMS system. He didn't do that on what

they are going to argue was a TV/2 system in existence. And he didn't do it on the RIMS brochure.

So we just can't send something to the jury where there was no expert opinion to show how it anticipated or rendered obvious every element of all the claims in suit.

MR. McDONALD: I think they're putting more on Dr. Shamos' shoulders than he needs to have. He compared the claims to the description of the RIMS system in the April '93 filing for patent. Other evidence establishes that that same product as described in that filing was on sale. Dr. Shamos doesn't have to provide that evidence in order for the jury to find that it's also prior art for those other reasons.

This time line establishes along with the testimony of the system being wrapped up and the RIMS brochure that describes these many key features that are relevant to the claim elements. This other evidence establishes the facts that the RIMS system was on sale, was in public use, was known in the marketplace in ways that would make it prior art under 102(a) and (b).

MS. ALBERT: I don't think the post fact time line of Mr. Kinross establishes a clear and convincing

evidence that any system had those features. As he testified, he made that time line sometime in like 2005 without any documents to corroborate it. And this was just based on his memory 20 years later.

MR. McDONALD: These are adverse witnesses that had every incentive to do what ePlus is trying to do today, which is to try to muck up the evidence of when RIMS had features and things came in later. But even so, these biased witnesses that are aligned with ePlus put together this time line admitting that it had all of these features that you see going back to 1989 to 1992. So this is very powerful evidence, Your Honor, that should be able to go to the jury on these features.

MR. ROBERTSON: But there's no expert evidence saying whatever is here renders every element of the claim invalid. You would think if this was powerful evidence, Dr. Shamos would have taken it and said, Yes, I also relied on Mr. Kinross' time line, and let me tell you why each and every element of the claims is satisfied by this document, the RIMS brochure, or any other evidence he has to some commercial use or embodiment of the system. He didn't do it.

I would submit he didn't do it because he

couldn't do it, which is essentially what he admitted in his cross-examination.

THE COURT: What did Ms. Eng say about the development of the TV/2 interface? If I recall correctly, she said quite clearly that they started to work and that whole project wasn't even complete until 1995 after she left.

MR. McDONALD: That's a different issue.

THE COURT: No, it isn't, and I'll tell you why it isn't. Because on Kinross, for example, 1993, it says developed TV interface. What it is is that's when it started, but you-all have convincingly proved that it may have started in 1993, but it wasn't ready until 1995. So this evidence is not probative at all of whether this was out in the public domain or was on sale one year beforehand, that it was out in the public domain before August of '94 or on sale one year before, in April of '93.

So, I mean, it seems to me that this document, the Kinross document, which has some probative value has been utterly gutted by the testimony of your own witness Ms. Eng.

MR. McDONALD: Your Honor --

THE COURT: She is your consultant and she and Gounaris blew that theory right out of the water.

MR. McDONALD: Well, I think this is consistent with that, but the point is --

THE COURT: How is it consistent with that?

Ms. Eng and Mr. Gounaris said what was done at IBM with the TV/2 interface wasn't finished until 1995.

How is it consistent with this time line prepared years after the fact where they thought that the TV/2 interface was developed?

MR. McDONALD: That was the final development. They did also testified that at the very beginning of the project they did a prototype to demonstrate all the features were workable in an embodiment of a product.

THE COURT: It didn't work.

MR. McDONALD: It did work. They had one with a few pages of the catalog. It wasn't the full thing, but it did work.

THE COURT: What they did is had some slides. They didn't have anything that worked.

MR. McDONALD: The first phase of their interaction between Fisher and IBM was to put together a smaller version of a demonstration model that showed a few pages.

THE COURT: I know you tried like the dickens to get her to call it a demonstration and model, and

all it was was a bunch of pictures. That's all it was.

MR. McDONALD: That's different testimony,
Your Honor. We're taking about two different things.

THE COURT: No, we're not. We're talking about the exact --

MR. McDONALD: Again, this goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence.

THE COURT: No, it doesn't. The question is:
In deciding whether or not there's clear and
convincing evidence, you don't judge the credibility
of the evidence, but you look at the evidence to see
whether in the aggregate a jury could look at that
evidence and conclude firmly a proposition in this
proposition that the patent was invalid under the
theories being offered. And that is what you do. And
that's not the same thing as weighing the evidence.
It's assessing what it is that the evidence construed
in your favor could do.

MR. McDONALD: Right. And with that April
'93 patent filing, the jury has every right to
conclude through their common sense and just applying
what people do in that they filed the patent
application based on the RIMS system as it existed in
April of '93, as it was being offered for sale.

That would be the logical thing to do. And the jury could put that into the equation as well here and weigh all the evidence. That April '93 filing would be logically the most relevant description of the product as it existed one year and four months before the patents in this suit were even filed.

THE COURT: But if you don't have an expert that does anything with any of these on sale issues given the complexity of the system, what difference does it make?

MR. McDONALD: Well, the expert went through detailed description of the RIMS system that the patent itself links to being a known requisition system, and the same timing as the trademark application. He doesn't have to give them all the different types of prior art in order for the jury to look at the other evidence of the sale and use and public knowledge aspects of the RIMS evidence and say, Yes, it's all the same system. Of course, they did it at the same time. If you take that snapshot in April of '93, there's no evidence they had a lot of different RIMS systems floating around at any given moment.

The April '93 RIMS system is the April '93 RIMS system for all purposes.

THE COURT: The evidence, and it's not disputed as far as I know, is that from the time it was developed until the time the application was filed that it was changed, and it went through something like 40 iterations. And that's not disputed. And then in addition to that, the inventors testified that there never was a system implemented at anytime that did all of what was in that patent.

Now, is there any evidence to contradict either one of those statements?

MR. McDONALD: Well, that's very general testimony, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm asking you general or specific, is there anything to respond to that?

MR. McDONALD: Well, I think that testimony to some extent is contradicted by the RIMS brochure that they distributed in the pubic. They are in conflict. Their testimony to some extent is in conflict with what the Fisher company was representing publicly were the capabilities of that system. So, yes, there is a conflict in the evidence of that.

THE COURT: And it comes from the Fisher brochure.

MR. McDONALD: Yes. They testified that some

of the features -- oh, we didn't do that. Well, the brochure represented that it does do that. So there's a conflict right there. Some of their testimony is in conflict with the time line here. And also I think it's in conflict with just the logic here that if they were really making a bunch of changes to the Fisher RIMS system after April of '93, why do all the patents in this suit filed not until August of '94 only rely on that description that's one year and four months old? Why wouldn't they have given an undated description using whatever version of RIMS had changed between April of '93?

THE COURT: There's no evidence in the case that addressed that issue.

That's really a specialized topic about whether you change what's in an application and update it.

MR. McDONALD: This is a new application.

THE COURT: You proved that yourself.

All right. Let me resolve this. I'm going to hold in abeyance ePlus' motions for JMOL on the issue of invalidity on all scores on this.

I'm going to deny the motion of Lawson for JMOL on the invalidity issues. And I'm going to send the invalidity issues to the jury.

If I were deciding the case, I would find that there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove any component of validity, but there are factual discrepancies that a jury needs to resolve. And when we have a complete record, a verdict comes out the wrong way for somebody, I'm sure we'll have, for ePlus, we'll have a motion on that.

If, as I expect, the jury returns a verdict in favor of ePlus on these issues, then I won't have to deal with the JMOL, but I have reserved it.

What do we do here with this instruction? Let's get back to the instructions.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Your Honor, we would ask under Rule 37 that they be precluded from making this argument that we can't assert obviousness for Claim One of the '172 patent because they did not assert that in their interrogatory responses.

THE COURT: But you allowed them to put it into the final pretrial order without objection, and I have to show -- I don't apply the Rule 37 test to something that's in that order, do I?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Your Honor, that was their portion of the pretrial order. We had P.O. Writer plus J-CON in the final pretrial, and we were still precluded there. Their section of the pretrial order,

we had no control over it, and it was not a joint section, and they didn't put it in their interrogatory responses.

MS. ALBERT: Your Honor, we did raise the 103(c(1) issue in our opposition to Lawson's motion for summary judgment of invalidity on obviousness back whenever that was filed in June.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: That was after discovery closed. It didn't relieve them of their obligation to disclose their theories in their contention interrogatories. We've been held very firmly to that obligation in this case, and we have been precluded from theories that we raised in the pretrial order, and they should be held up to the same standard.

If that was their theory, it needed to go in their interrogatories responses. It wasn't there and they should be precluded.

We went all the way through this trial, Your Honor, and they didn't bring it up once. It wasn't in their jury instructions. They asked their expert --

THE COURT: I'll take care of that later if it comes to pass that I need to take care of it.

MS. ALBERT: It would not have been in a jury instruction because it's a pure matter of law.

THE COURT: It's a matter of law anyway.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: They put them in their 1 2 jury instructions now for the first time. THE COURT: All right. Let's go. We're on 3 29. And we take that out at the bottom. What else? 4 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Your Honor. So we 5 agreed to take out line 3 on 29. 6 7 THE COURT: No, you have agreed to take out all of paragraph 3. 8 9 MR. ROBERTSON: I'm sorry, yes. 10 THE COURT: And the word "and" and put a period after the word "art" on 29. 11 12 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir. And we need to --13 MR. CARR: The issue, Your Honor, is whether '172 should be included in that list of patents that 14 is in No. 2. That's the issue. 15 16 MR. ROBERTSON: It's agnostic as to any 17 patent right now. 18 THE COURT: There's nothing in there. MR. McDONALD: So do we agree that the "of 19 20 the '683 and '516 patents" should come out? 21 MR. ROBERTSON: I'm looking at the Court's 22 instruction. So if you go back to the Court's 23 instruction, it doesn't specify any patents. So we're 24 agreeing to the Court's construction as we understand 25 the Court's ruling.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay. 1 2 THE COURT: Everybody agree that that's the right instruction given the reservations? 3 Is there an objection to 30? Or what's the 4 next one to which there is an objection? 5 6 MR. ROBERTSON: So --7 THE COURT: Do you have an objection to 30? MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir. 8 9 THE COURT: What is it? 10 MR. ROBERTSON: No. 2 we think should come 11 out because there's no patent at issue more than one 12 year before the filing date of the patent or before the invention was made. 13 MR. McDONALD: We would agree with that. 14 15 THE COURT: Yes. It should be -- wait a The whole 2 comes out, doesn't it? 16 minute. 17 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir. MR. McDONALD: That's right. 18 19 THE COURT: Right. And then --20 MR. ROBERTSON: And I guess the rest can stay the same in light of your ruling, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: And then you renumber these 23 things. Does everybody agree? 24 MR. McDONALD: Agreed. 25 THE COURT: All right.

1 MR. ROBERTSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 2 reminded at one point we'd like to come to agreement. I think we did on the break as to what prior art can 3 be considered either for on sale, public use, the 4 patents or what not, and I think the list that we had 5 and we're going to propose an instruction would be 6 7 that the '989 patent, which Dr. Shamos did testify, the TV/2 brochure, which Dr. Shamos did testify, the 8 9 TV/2 general information manual, and then now there's this RIMS system, TV/2 system, and RIMS brochure. 10 Those latter three we disagree have a level of 11 12 specificity necessary for the jury --13 THE COURT: No, because they have insisted it's as described in the '989. So it's the RIMS 14 system and the TV/2 system as described in the '989. 15 16 MR. ROBERTSON: Well --17 THE COURT: That's it. MR. ROBERTSON: All right. 18 THE COURT: That's their argument. 19 20 that's the limit on it. So the jury will never know 21 what RIMS system there is if there are 40 different versions of it and we don't tell them. 22 23 MR. McDONALD: Just to be clear, the type of 24 prior art it could be, though, with RIMS system could

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be on sale, public use --

THE COURT: That's irrelevant to what I'm 1 2 talking about. The identity of the prior art is the patent of the '989 patent, the RIMS system, and the 3 TV/2 system as described therein in those two 4 brochures. And then --5 MR. McDONALD: The TV/2 system is not 6 7 described in the RIMS patent. It's just the RIMS system --8 9 THE COURT: The TV/2 system is described some in there. It's not described in the detail that RIMS 10 11 12 MR. ROBERTSON: I think we agree that it's 13 the TV/2 system that's described in the two brochures. THE COURT: In the brochures? 14 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes. 15 16 THE COURT: What I'm saying is you do describe it in the patent because you incorporate 17 those two brochures in the --18 19 MR. ROBERTSON: Not in the '989. 20 THE COURT: Not in the '989. MR. McDONALD: It's very confusing to have 21 the one patent in the other patent. 22 23 MR. ROBERTSON: Let me just make clear for 24 the record, though, I agree that's what they are 25 proposing. I didn't want to suggest that we were

agreeing that ePlus agrees that those three pieces of those three systems or brochure are prior art.

MR. McDONALD: But there's TV/2 literature, the two pieces of literature we agree on, the RIMS patent we agree on. We also assert that the RIMS brochure is prior art evidence.

THE COURT: What's the RIMS brochure?

MR. McDONALD: What is it?

THE COURT: Which RIMS brochure?

MR. ROBERTSON: The advertiser's brochure attached to the trademark application, Your Honor, that Ms. O'Loughlin testified to.

THE COURT: That's different than the RIMS brochure that's referred to in the patent or the same one?

MR. McDONALD: There is no RIMS brochure referred to. There's a Technical Viewer/2 system that's referred to.

THE COURT: TV/2, okay.

MR. McDONALD: But the RIMS brochure is DX 61, and also in the file it's DX 62. It's the identical brochure. So it's just one RIMS brochure. That's evidence.

There's also the testimony about the RIMS system being on sale.

THE COURT: I'm not going to tell them about that.

MR. McDONALD: Well, we're entitled to have them know that it was on sale because that's additional kind of prior art.

THE COURT: Whether it was on sale is a fact issue, and I would find that it wasn't on sale. A reasonable juror, I think, would find that it wasn't on sale. So I'm not going to tell them that it was on sale because that's their province, isn't it?

MR. McDONALD: Well, it's a fact issue is what I'm saying for the jury?

THE COURT: Whether it's on sale is a fact issue.

MR. McDONALD: Right. But we're saying that's one of our contentions. I think we're trying to get a list of what's being contended here.

MR. ROBERTSON: I regret to tell Your Honor I may have misspoke on this RIMS brochure because Dr. Shamos didn't offer testimony about it, so we didn't offer rebuttal testimony that it would, in fact, not invalidate. So we're in disagreement.

THE COURT: Leave this alone. I'm not going to deal with this right now. Let's get on to what we have got on the table. You'll have to deal with that

later.

All right. What's the next objection on the instructions you were given?

MR. ROBERTSON: I'm sorry, before we get to 32, I think 31, Your Honor, we wanted to insert the one patent that's alleged to be anticipated. In this case, Lawson can contend that each of the claims of ePlus patents are anticipated by, and we wanted to put in the '989 patent.

THE COURT: Do you object to that?

MR. McDONALD: We don't object to adding that. We just think that the additional description of the RIMS system should also be listed as anticipation.

MR. ROBERTSON: We'd object to that.

MR. McDONALD: That's what you said we're going to move on from that.

THE COURT: I'm not going to deal with that now. What I'll do is at the point -- you-all are going to have to work out how to deal with this or I'm going to have to decide it, and I'll just say the people contend that the prior art is such and such. And you have to decide what the prior art is.

The people that contend that the anticipating is, and you'll have to decide whether it anticipates.

And I'll do that in a separate instruction, and I don't need to modify these to do that. So you-all need to prepare that list and help me see, each of you, what your contentions are on those points.

So any 32?

MR. ROBERTSON: No, sir.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Actually, on 32, Your
Honor, I think we'd like to say in the second line,
Lawson contends that all the claims of ePlus' patents
were anticipated and/or rendered obvious. So as it
was originally drafted, I think it just said
anticipated, and then I added "rendered obvious," but
it really should be "anticipated and/or rendered
obvious," to make it less confusing.

THE COURT: You took out "rendered obvious" in your instruction on this. You took out "anticipated" and put in --

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: I know. That was a mistake, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, there's a separate instruction on obviousness.

THE COURT: Yeah. I don't think that we're going do that. I'm trying to keep this in a discrete breakout for this jury to understand, and all it

does -- quite using the jury -- let me tell you. 1 2 not using instructions to lard it up. And I'm now at the point where if I find that what you're doing is 3 trying to lard it up, I'm just going to go throw it 4 out because the obligation here is to give them a 5 correct and reasonable instruction. 6 7 I already have instructions later on obviousness. And that's what we're going to do. 8 9 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay. THE COURT: We're not going to add it 10 together. That's confusing and causes problems. 11 12 any objections to 32? I'll get to obviousness later. 13 MR. ROBERTSON: No objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: None other than wanting to put in 14 anticipated and obvious; is that right? 15 MR. McDONALD: And/or obvious. 16 17 THE COURT: And or, yes. Prior public use. 18 MR. ROBERTSON: The same issue, Your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: What's the same issue? MR. ROBERTSON: We want to enter "and/or 21 rendered obvious." 22 23 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to do that. 24 I'm going to deal with obviousness in other instructions. 25

MR. McDONALD: Understood. We want the same thing, but we understand the answer is the same.

There is at the bottom of that page, this is some language we had proposed to have eliminated when we were discussing with Mr. Robertson before. He said he would think about it. Do you have an answer?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: We didn't think experimental use was really an issue in this case.

MR. McDONALD: It would be very confusing for the jury to hear about experimental use.

MR. ROBERTSON: I'll agree to strike it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Experimental use or determine if it was capable of performing its intended use?

MR. McDONALD: The whole last sentence that begins with the word "if."

THE COURT: I know, but there's more than just experimental use in there, and I thought this was in simply because of what went on over at the IBM and whatever you call it, the IBM project. That's what they were doing, it seems to me.

MR. McDONALD: This relates to there's a very discrete exception to on sale, which is experimental use, and there's no evidence on it.

MR. ROBERTSON: I actually made a note in the

margin about TV/2, Your Honor. So let me press and say we'd like to keep that language in.

MR. McDONALD: Moreover, that's a specific affirmative thing that should have been disclosed in their interrogatories. They never disclosed an experimental use exception to the on sale. So it should not come in for that reason as well.

MR. ROBERTSON: This was their burden. They put on a witness. We cross-examined. I thought we established these facts. I can't tell you what their witness is going to say before they get on the witness stand. And we dealt with it as we did with Ms. Eng and Mr. Gounaris.

THE COURT: Did you ask them an interrogatory that said, Tell us what your contentions are as to this in response to our contention of on sale bar?

MR. McDONALD: Yes, we presented the on sale bar as one of the reasons for invalidity. We asked for their contentions in response to that.

THE COURT: What did they say?

MR. McDONALD: They didn't say anything about experimental use.

MR. ROBERTSON: I didn't know -- they didn't tell us the facts about TV/2. All they said is we're going to rely on TV/2. And it was the brochures that

were identified. So now they brought a witness live and they testified and we elicited that there's been experimental use.

MR. McDONALD: Ms. Eng, I think, has met
Mr. Robertson more than once before, about five years
ago. I don't think he can say anything she had to say
was a surprise.

MR. ROBERTSON: She was your consultant. I couldn't talk to her. I could only depose her.

MR. McDONALD: You could have talked to her.

MR. ROBERTSON: I don't think ethically I could have once you identified her as a consultant. But let's move forward. I think it's appropriate we have this last sentence in here. I think it was from a standard instruction, and it's an accurate statement of the law.

THE COURT: Well, unless you-all show me something that knocks it out because of a failure to provide discovery -- I think what happened here is that the issue became framed far differently after discovery and in the trial and in the pretrial order. And you-all basically preserved all this in the pretrial order. And I don't know that this is an instance where the discovery actually called for this given the framing of the issues at that time.

MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, referring to the pretrial order, there's no reference at all to experimental use in the pretrial order.

THE COURT: No. You preserved the issue of on sale bar, and then it became crystalized at the trial.

MR. McDONALD: I think experimental use has to be --

THE COURT: I'll let you-all research it and brief it. These are things you could have raised a long time ago. You didn't. And I'm not going to have them raised here. I have to go back and check every piece of paper in order to make it. And I have found that when I've checked paper based on assertions, the partner doesn't also bear out the assertions in this case. And I've had that on both sides. I'm not levying blame on one side or the other. But I can't make these decisions without having the evidence and I'm not going to.

MR. ROBERTSON: Just so it's clear on the record, Your Honor, I understand Your Honor's earlier ruling. Our position is there shouldn't be any prior public use instruction, but I understand the Court's ruling. I just don't want my acquiescence in this to suggest that --

THE COURT: Do you think that anybody who reads this record would believe that you ever acquiesced in anything?

Okay. 34. There are no objections to 34?

MR. ROBERTSON: On 34, Your Honor, there is public use or knowledge in there, but I understand the Court's ruling, and given the Court's ruling, we had some suggested language, but we will now withdraw that understanding it's over our objection.

THE COURT: 35.

MR. McDONALD: 35, Your Honor, I think there was just on line 3, let's start there. The "inventors," I think that word should be "inventions."

THE COURT: It's there.

MR. McDONALD: That's already been corrected.

THE COURT: The first thing is they talk about anticipated.

MR. McDONALD: Right. We would repeat our request that be in or rendered obvious, understanding that you already ruled on that issue.

THE COURT: I think, don't we get back here and deal with that in the obviousness? If we don't, we'll add it back there, but I just don't want to confuse the jury.

MR. McDONALD: Understood.

THE COURT: Because there are certain components of the ensuing text that don't relate to obviousness, the way the instruction has been prepared from the model instructions and the once you-all tendered. So I'm trying to keep it all together.

Now, you object to "in order to be on sale, the invention" --

MR. McDONALD: No, Your Honor. We'll just withdraw that objection. We'll leave it in.

THE COURT: So you're fine with 35 as it is.

You're fine with 35 as it is with your objection to the whole concept. Is that right, Mr. Robertson?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. 36.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, what we'd like with respect to this printed publication is to add just a level of specificity as to what the printed publications are that the jury should be considering. And one of the reasons we're pressing that, Your Honor, is because you will recall there were some other suggestions with respect to the J-CON system and the P.O. Writer system that we understand are now not at issue any longer.

And there were questions by the jury with

respect to those systems.

MR. McDONALD: I don't know if we have to talk about that. I don't think we have a problem specifying what we're talking about when we say "printed publications." We don't dispute that these two TV/2 documents should be amongst the list. We would just add a third one, the RIMS brochure.

MR. ROBERTSON: Again, Your Honor, we agree that the TV/2 general information manual and the brochure should be there. We are in disagreement on the RIMS brochure.

THE COURT: And you disagree why?

MR. ROBERTSON: Well, because, first, it doesn't have a level of specificity that a jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that it validates, and there was no expert testimony whatsoever that would permit the jury to draw that conclusion under the standard. And we believe the cases we've cited to you before about the requirement for expert testimony --

THE COURT: KSR?

MR. ROBERTSON: That's Kioto and Proveris and Innogenetics.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I thought you objected to it because there wasn't any factual basis

to conclude when it was --1 2 MR. ROBERTSON: Well, there's no date on it, but I will concede it was attached to a trademark 3 application that has a date. 4 THE COURT: Filed in '92. 5 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir. 6 MR. McDONALD: Filed in April '93. April 7 193. 8 9 MR. ROBERTSON: I think a reasonable 10 inference could be that it existed in April of 1993. I won't quibble with that. 11 12 THE COURT: So what do you want to do? Isn't 13 this just going to be picked up in you all's instruction that we contend that this is prior art. 14 We contend that it's not. It's up to you, the jury, 15 to decide which it is. 16 MR. ROBERTSON: That's fine, Your Honor. I 17 think that will be a good place to focus it. 18 19 THE COURT: The second paragraph you wanted 20 to take out, but that was basically because you didn't 21 think there was any evidence on that. 22 Mr. Robertson, I was talking to you. 23 don't object to it. 24 MR. ROBERTSON: To taking it out? 25 THE COURT: They don't object to the

1 instruction I'm giving. You want it taken out. Why? 2 What the Sam Hill is going on? 3 MR. ROBERTSON: We can leave it in, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: 5 Okay. Come on. Let's qo. 6 MR. McDONALD: On the second page, Your 7 Honor, we've reached agreement that those last two sentences of the penultimate paragraph on issued 8 9 patent is a printed publication. A published patent application is a printed publication as of its 10 11 publication date. We both agree those can be 12 stricken. THE COURT: I'm taken it out then. Far be it 13 from me to stand in the way of disagreement. 14 15 37, any objections to 37? 16 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: We pretty much reached an agreement on this one, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Good. 18 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: And you can actually look 19 20 at ePlus' version. THE COURT: Look at ePlus' version. 21 MR. McDONALD: Let's take it from the top. 22 23 THE COURT: Take out a prior issued patent on 24 the third line. Do you all agree? 25 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And take the second 1 2 sentence out, right? MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: It's the second paragraph and the 4 5 second sentence. Same thing. The paragraph first, 6 you-all agree that should come out? 7 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes. THE COURT: All right. And then second comes 8 9 out? 10 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes. THE COURT: And then in this case Lawson 11 12 relies on the following as a prior art -- as a patent 13 prior art patent. MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes. 14 15 THE COURT: As a prior art patent to the patents-in-suit. And that then is Johnson, et al., 16 right? 17 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: 18 Yes. THE COURT: And we take out these others. 19 20 Okay. 21 In this case, okay, we take out ePlus. 22 take out "admits that the King and Dworkin patents are 23 prior art but it." Okay. 24 All right. That's fine. 25 MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, on that one, I

think we should fix title to it as well.

THE COURT: We don't have any titles. The titles are simply for you-all to have something to go by. The jury's version has the number. It has no title and it has no footers with authority. They are just for you and for us to talk about.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay.

THE COURT: So the second page is okay of that.

Now we're on obviousness.

MR. ROBERTSON: We have number 38 we wanted to insert the '683 and '516 on the basis of this '172, but we now agree with the Court's construction based on the ruling.

THE COURT: And your objection there to that is preserved, I take it; is that what you're saying?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So are you in agreement with No. 38, Lawson?

MR. McDONALD: We have no objections to 38.

MR. ROBERTSON: Actually, Your Honor, I should just note for the record, though, on 36, it's printed publication, we had an objection to that, but I understand the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: All right. 39?

MR. ROBERTSON: We have no objections, Your 1 2 Honor. 3 MR. McDONALD: No objections, Your Honor. THE COURT: I would say at this point we 4 5 would put in either here or someplace we have to put 6 in what you contend is the prior art. One way to do 7 it is to say in the front up by anticipation that you consider it anticipates and they consider it's 8 9 disputed. And you have to decide. And then do the 10 obviousness as a separate one back here if they are different. And then I'll just stick them in as an (A) 11 12 instruction behind whatever instruction they follow. 13 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay. THE COURT: You'll get that to me tomorrow. 14 Non-pejorative, non-larded up. Okay? 15 16 MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay. 17 THE COURT: 40, any objections? MR. ROBERTSON: No, Your Honor. 18 19 MR. McDONALD: No, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: 41? MR. ROBERTSON: No, Your Honor. 21 MR. McDONALD: No objections. 22 23 THE COURT: 42? 24 MR. ROBERTSON: We both had some changes 25 here, but I think we worked out most of them.

THE COURT: Somebody want to tell me what you 1 2 want to do? MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, for paragraph 2 3 where it starts, "Was there longfelt," the parties 4 agreed to add in the words after the comma "but 5 6 unresolved." 7 MR. ROBERTSON: "Longfelt, but unresolved." THE COURT: Wait a minute. All right. 8 9 MR. STRAPP: And paragraph No. 6, the parties agreed to strike after field strict comma or Lawson. 10 11 THE COURT: What? 12 MR. STRAPP: It should read, "Did others in the field praise, " and then strike "or Lawson." 13 THE COURT: Oh. How did that get in there? 14 MR. STRAPP: And then the last change the 15 parties agreed to make, if you take a look at ePlus' 16 red line version, on the next page after the 17 instruction we added a sentence, the parties agreed 18 on, that states, "answering any, or all, of these 19 20 questions yes may suggest that the claim is not obvious." 21 22 THE COURT: Well, you know I think that's 23 also in the model instruction, but why tell them that? 24 That's a silly sentence. Why would we do that? 25 MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, we withdraw it.

THE COURT: What have we been telling them up to that time? All right.

All right 43 is out. Right?

MR. STRAPP: Yes, 43 is out.

THE COURT: And 44?

MR. ROBERTSON: No objection.

THE COURT: All right.

Does that take care of the instructions? I need to do the instruction that I'll put in that says about the advice of counsel. And I read it to you, and you approved it, but I want to make sure that you-all agree.

MR. McDONALD: I don't think we actually heard it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, you did. It's in the record. This one somebody can find. I told you I'm going to tell the jury this, and I read it to you.

Jurors, the other day when Mr. Christopherson testified, there was some testimony about whether he or other lay witnesses at Lawson formed a viewpoint about whether Lawson infringed the patents or whether Lawson obtained an opinion of counsel of non-infringement or invalidity of the patents. I instruct you now that I've excluded all that testimony, and I'm asking you to disregard it.

that.

MR. McDONALD: We do have an objection to a part of that, and that's the part that would exclude the lay testimony. We don't think the fact that we proffered nonprivileged evidence on the issue should

THE COURT: This is the language that you proposed. Oh, no. This came from ePlus.

MR. McDONALD: Our proposal was to focus on the opinion of counsel issue and just have the jury disregard the evidence relating to that issue, but allow the testimony about the analysis apart from counsel.

So we had proposed jury instruction No. 3 that says, "Lawson had no duty to get an opinion from counsel on whether or not it infringes ePlus' patents. Both parties in this case have received advice from counsel without disclosing that advice to the other party. This is normal. You may make no determinations based on the fact that Lawson did not disclose the opinion it received from its Lawson's to ePlus. That fact has nothing to do with this case."

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, we'd object to

THE COURT: I'm not giving that. I'm going to strike the part that says whether he or other lay

witnesses at Lawson formed a viewpoint about whether Lawson infringed the patents, and it will read, "The other day Mr. Christopherson testified there was some testimony about whether Lawson obtained an opinion of non-infringement or invalidity of the patents. I instruct you now I've excluded all that testimony and I'm instructing you to disregard it."

MR. McDONALD: Our objection, Your Honor, just to be clear, is that we do think the jury needs to be clear that the fact that we didn't produce the advice shouldn't be held against us in a sense.

That's what we think is missing.

MR. ROBERTSON: I think the instruction makes that clear and is adequate.

THE COURT: I'll just add that has nothing do with the case.

All right. And that will be inserted in instruction number No. 13A.

Now, is there anything else I need to go over here with the instructions?

MR. ROBERTSON: Well, Your Honor, we need to get together and give you a summary of what the prior art is going to be. I would anticipate we could do something like Lawson contends that the prior art at issue is X and ePlus contends the alleged prior art

involved is Y.

THE COURT: It's up to you to decide these as a factual matter based on the instruction I give you on those points, right?

MR. ROBERTSON: Right. The other thing we have, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Is that what you're going to prepare?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Where is the first time prior art is mentioned? Is it the same prior art for anticipation and obviousness now? Huh?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Not exactly. The RIMS stuff is anticipation and obviousness. TV/2 is just obviousness.

THE COURT: Then you need to do one for anticipation and one for obviousness.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Wait just a minute. Wait just a minute. Let's go back to the one about scope of the prior art. I don't think that would be right then if you're right. Back near the back there's something about scope of the prior art.

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, there's a summary of invalidity defenses. Maybe it would make sense to put

it there.

THE COURT: We'll just solve this problem first.

No. 39, the prior art that you considered previously for anticipation is also prior art for obviousness. We can't say that then in light of what Ms. Stoll-DeBell just said, right?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Right.

THE COURT: So this will be replaced by --

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Your Honor --

THE COURT: The definition is the same, the paragraph is the same. Why don't we do this. Why don't we just have you all prepare Lawson contends that prior art for obviousness is X. EPlus contends that prior art for obviousness is Y. It's up to you to decide what is prior art for obviousness. And we'll put that in here at No. 39.

I'm going to call that new obviousness, which
I hope you'll have over here in the morning.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Okay.

THE COURT: All right?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And then back at instruction No. 30. After No. 30, it will be 30A, and you will say, Lawson contends that prior art for

anticipation purposes is X. EPlus contends that it is Y, and it's up to you to decide.

MR. ROBERTSON: Just for the record, Your Honor, I understand your ruling on the '989 patent and the JMOL is going to be granted, so, obviously, that would be over our objection with respect to that patent.

We don't have an allegation as to what the prior art is.

THE COURT: Just say ePlus disagrees that any of this is prior art. The logical extension of what I said is if I were negotiating with the other side would be to say, ePlus contends that none of this is prior art. If you don't agree with any of it, that's the only way you can articulate it, right?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Those two things I will expect over. That's a 30A and a new whatever it was.

MR. McDONALD: 39.

THE COURT: 39. Okay.

Now, is there any other instruction I need to deal with?

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, we wanted to press again our request that there be instruction that demonstratives are not evidence. We think,

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particularly in a patent case, it can be very confusing for a jury when they see a lot of documents that can constitute evidence such as evidence produced by the parties --

THE COURT: I agree that that's an appropriate instruction. I have a substantial disagreement with your fundamental theory. When you try cases the way you tried them and you use these demonstratives as the vehicle for presenting complex testimony and bullet pointing it, the jury inevitably is going to come back and say I'd like to have it. And I think you ought to give it to them because you're going to use it. You've used it in the testimony. You've used it in the argument. And you have to agree on what you're going to give to them. But you have an absolute right to be told that the demonstratives are not exhibits and can't be considered. And you have an absolute right to keep the demonstratives -- there actually is a case about whether demonstratives go back to the jury. And I think the case is United States v. Johnson, and an immanent jurist dissented in the case while he was sitting on the Fourth Circuit. And I can't remember which way it went, in any event, I felt that's a help, but that's something you-all can do only if you agree

to it.

You had things with Dr. Shamos that illustrated very well what your theories were. And remember what you're asking them to take care of, to think about, and to keep track of.

And you had things that explained very well what your theories were. And I am not trying the case for either one of you, but if you want the instruction, I will give an instruction.

MR. ROBERTSON: We had an agreed instruction on it.

THE COURT: Can I have it? You're not taking the wise advice of on old man. I can see that right now.

MR. ROBERTSON: I'd like to hand this up to the Court because this was our agreed instruction.

I'd like to think about it a little bit. Quite frankly, if I wanted to concede anything, Your Honor, it would be that we got out-demonstratived in this case, and I'm a little concerned that some of the demonstratives, for example, with Dr. Shamos were sort of like a written brief summarizing arguments, and I am reluctant to send something like that back to the jury.

THE COURT: Look, that's a decision that

trial lawyers make in their tactical decisions, and you-all can do that if you want. All I intended to say was if you-all are in agreement and want to do it, we'll craft an instruction and do it. But it's up to you. If you feel like you have been out-demonstratived, I wouldn't think about agreeing to that. It would be crazy.

All right let's see. You-all agree on this text?

MR. McDONALD: I didn't read it over in detail, but if it say "demonstratives" --

THE COURT: Let me read it to you.

"Certain demonstratives exhibits have been shown to you in the course of the trial. Those demonstrative exhibits are used for convenience and to help explain the facts in the case. They are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts. If they don't correctly reflect the facts shown by the evidence in the case, you should disregard the demonstratives and determine the facts" -- I just think I'd take that sentence out. Just say, "They are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts," period. Won't that solve it?

MR. McDONALD: That works for us without the last sentence.

MR. ROBERTSON: That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And we'll make that jury instruction number -- this will be instruction No. 14A. Okay?

Now, you-all have handed me other things, and I don't purport to have been a good housekeeper up here. I just want to make sure we don't have anything else you-all need me to deal with by way of instructions.

We have a verdict form to deal with. We're going to take a break in a minute.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, we do have this issue about whether or not the '989 was considered by the examiner, and we've argued that this morning. We have proffered authority. Lawson's proffered authority. We did propose an instruction on it.

THE COURT: I'm sure I have it up here among these things. Do you have an extra copy I can look at?

MR. ROBERTSON: This is my only copy, but you can look at it.

THE COURT: Any objection to that? To the substance of it as opposed to the giving of it?

MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, just for clarifying, are you referring to ePlus instruction 42?

instruction, prior art considered by the examiner. I understand your position that you think that it's not even prior art. I disagree with that, and I think the cases that were cited -- I think if you read the manual as a whole, and what do you call it, the MPEP as a whole, it is clear that the disclosure made in this case in this patent can be considered as having been considered as prior art on the facts of this case, and the objection that you've made to striking it -- I guess you made a request to strike it, didn't you?

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, sir, with respect to instruction No. 42, I am.

THE COURT: I think that's the ruling in the Gould case and the --

MR. ROBERTSON: Eastman Kodak?

THE COURT: Polaroid v. Eastman Kodak, Indiana Mills, and the manual taken as a whole teach that that's the applicable rule.

So now that being the case, what do we do about instructing it? Why does it come up? Why does it come up at all if nobody argues it?

Suppose I just say you can't make the argument that it's not prior art or wasn't considered?

Because there really isn't any evidence on that except 1 2 what appears in the file folder, and the guy actually wrote something in the file folder about the matter. 3 So how do you propose that we deal with it 4 now we're at this point on the law, Mr. Schultz? 5 6 MR. SCHULTZ: We also submitted an 7 instruction on this matter, Your Honor, and it's in our proposed instruction, the red line version you 8 9 have there. Which one is it? 10 THE COURT: MR. SCHULTZ: Lawson proposed jury 11 12 instruction No. 1. THE COURT: I don't have it. 13 MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, it's actually 14 15 No. 2. 16 THE COURT: I start with 8. MR. SCHULTZ: It's at the back, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Oh, it's at the back. 18 Excuse me. 19 Three. 20 MR. SCHULTZ: It's No. 2. So Lawson proposed jury instruction No. 2. 21 22 The face of any THE COURT: Two. Okay. 23 patent issued by the United States Patent and 24 Trademark Office list of references that are cited to 25 the Patent and Trademark Office under the heading

"References cited." This list includes all the references the examiner considered as prior art when determining whether to grant a patent to the claimed subject matter.

Okay. I can't give that given the ruling of law that I've made. So what about the one that they gave?

MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I think Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction No. 42 would be very highly prejudicial to Lawson.

THE COURT: Let's get down to where the rubber meets the road. Why are we going to have this issue argued to the jury at all now? Why does that even come in and, therefore, why do we need to instruct, Mr. Robertson?

MR. ROBERTSON: If the defendant doesn't argue it, I don't think we need an instruction. But I've asked counsel --

THE COURT: Given the ruling of law that I've made, how can you argue it?

MR. McDONALD: I guess given your ruling,
Your Honor, I understand we can't argue it. So if we
can't argue it, I don't see the need for that
instruction.

THE COURT: There's no need for an

instruction, do you agree?

MR. McDONALD: That's right. I understand the ruling specific to the RIMS patent, the '989 patent. The RIMS brochure, for example, that wasn't disclosed to the Patent Office. I assume we could talk about that.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. ROBERTSON: My colleagues reminded me throughout the case --

THE COURT: But you can't do it by saying it has to be in those lists.

MR. McDONALD: Okay.

THE COURT: Because that would then implicate the effect of the '989 that was disclosed. You just have to figure out a way to do it and say --

MR. McDONALD: That's not inconsistent with your ruling.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. McDONALD: I understand.

MR. ROBERTSON: Given Your Honor's ruling as to what the state of the law is, we can certainly argue that it was considered since it's cited throughout the patent 59 times and listed as incorporated by reference.

THE COURT: Why is that an issue?

MR. ROBERTSON: Because the presumption of validity attaches there and also because --

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell them the presumption -- let me tell you something. Don't be outthinking owls now about whether or not -- because could you open up a door that doesn't need to be opened up. I think it's a neutral factor here in this case.

MR. ROBERTSON: I think Dr. Shamos was asked whether or not it was considered by the Patent Office. So I think there's been testimony in the case that it wasn't considered.

THE COURT: I think I said he couldn't testify to that. Go back and check it because I do remember that in cross-examination, I believe, of one witness there was the file wrapper was an exhibit, and there was the question, Well, now look at this. And he had marked through the application number and written in the patent number. And I'm not sure what came of all of that.

MR. ROBERTSON: We'll go back and check, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. But if you're going to argue that, you look at what I ruled and whether it came in. I think I precluded him from testifying

about it.

MR. McDONALD: We don't think it should be at issue, and we'll stir clear of it. I understand your ruling and we'll argue it consistent with that and any instruction we think would be prejudicial, especially in view of what's going on with the reexaminations in the case.

THE COURT: Is there any issue that you think isn't impacted by the reexaminations?

MR. McDONALD: Those reexams are looking pretty good right now.

THE COURT: I'm sure they are. See what happens when you kind of zing those little zingers in? It doesn't have anything to do with what I'm doing on a particular issue.

Do you have some issue that I need to actually confront with respect to the reexaminations that, in fact, I haven't already ruled on?

MR. McDONALD: No. The issue is whether they are going to be able to argue it in closing arguments that the Patent Office did consider the '989 patent, and I'm saying that on specific issue I think you're saying we shouldn't be talking about it anyway.

Maybe I'm kicking a sleeping dog here. I'm not sure, but I think if you allowed them to go there,

and I can't talk about it, but they can go there on that, that's going to be prejudicial to me anyway, but it's going to be especially prejudicial and unfair in view of what's going on in the reexams.

MR. ROBERTSON: The reexams aren't in evidence. The patent is in evidence. And Your Honor made a ruling of law that said consistent with all those other cases and the MPEP, that it must be considered by the examiner.

THE COURT: No, that it's there to be considered as prior art by the examiner. There's a big difference. I'm not going to say that the examiner considered it. I don't know whether he did or not.

If I were the finder of the fact, I would find from the law that he could consider it, and that, in fact, it was considered. But my question is: How does that issue come up with respect to what they have to decide? Is there an issue that they actually have to decide with respect to what was considered by the Patent Office now?

MR. McDONALD: The context, I guess, really is the burden we have is clear and convincing evidence either way, and some people might say that shifts because if you assume that the examiner saw the prior,

art, that might make the burden higher or lower.

That's one of these patent lawyer debates on the head of a pin.

THE COURT: I agree it's how many angels can stand on a head of a pin, and I never have been good about deciding that issue.

All right. Now, so there are no other instructions at this time. Are you going to get those over to me first thing in the morning?

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Email them?

THE COURT: You can email them to

Ms. Haggard. She will get them taken care of for me.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, we did have that curative instruction with respect to Dr. Shamos' slide that had the Court's claim constructions in it. I proposed that if the defendant was not going to use those in closing arguments, then we don't need a curative instruction, but I don't think we resolved that.

MR. McDONALD: I asked for a copy of what slides they were talking about.

THE COURT: That was the last topic I heard -- discussion I heard on the topic was Mr.

McDonald requested what is it you're talking about, and I think that's a reasonable thing.

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              MR. ROBERTSON: I apologize. I will get that
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    to you.
              THE COURT: Get it to him, and we'll deal
 3
    with that.
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              All right. Now, we have a verdict form. So
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    we're going to take a break.
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              (Recess taken.)
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